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60 ARCHER v. CITY OF Los ANGELES. [19 C. (2d) 
thereby caused to collect was a contributing cause of the 
flooding. It must be remembered that these cases are here 
on appeal from judgments entered after orders granting non-
suits, and all the evidence must be viewed and every reason-
able inference drawn favorably to plaintiffs. There is un-
deniably sufficient evidence to require the submission of the 
cases to t.he jury on that question of fact. 
Summing up, we have cases where public agencies, with 
no proprietary right so to do, have collected surface waters 
by the install a tion of drains, have discharged those waters 
into a natural watercourse, and have failed to provide ade-
quate means of escape for those waters into the ocean well 
knowing that their conduct would cause the flooding of 
plaintiffs' premises. As a result of that conduct, the waters 
discharged in the watercourse· exceeded its capacity and could 
not escape through the inadequate outlet, and plaintiffs' land 
and the improvements thereon, not riparian to the stream1 
being three miles away, and not having theretofore been 
subject to overflow by any of the waters, are flooded and dam-
aged. The majority decision is contrary to the firmly estab-
lished law in California and the weight of authority in other 
jurisdictions .. It will not only result in a grievous miscar-
riage of justice in the cases now under consideration, but will 
cause great confusion in the law on the subject here involved. 
In my opinion the judgments should be reversed. 
CURTIS, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached in the 
dissenting opinion. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied December 
12, 1941. Curtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
Houser, J., did not participate therein. Spence, J., acting 
pro tcm. 
Nov. 1941.] O'HARA V. L. A. COUNTY FLOOD ETC. DIST. 61 
[L. A. No. 17614. In Bank. Nov. 14, 1041.] 
JAMIE 0 'HARA et a1., Appellants, v. LOS ANGELES 
COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT, Respondent. 
(1] Eminent Domain-Compensation-Necessity for and Right to 
-State Constitutional Guaranty.-Compensation for private 
property taken or damaged for public use must be mn.de under 
Const. art. I, § 14, only when the taking or damaging is not 
so e~sential to the public health, safety, and morals as to be 
justified under the police· power and the injury is one which 
would give rise to a cause of action by the owner if it were 
inflicted by a private person. 
[2] Waters - Surface Waters - Protection Against - Confining 
Waters-Improvements in Stream-Diversion.-A lower ri-
parian owner has no redress for injury to his land caused by 
improvements in tlie stream when there has been no diversion 
of water out of its natural channel. 
[3] Id.-Surface Waters-:-Protection Against-Public Improve-
ments- Increasing Velocity of Stream Waters.-A county 
flood control district which replaced dikes that bordered upon 
a river with concrete levees and constructed a concrete em-
bankment running at right angles to the levees, thereby ob-
structing the drainage of surface waters into the river, is not 
liable to property owners near the river, when due to heavy 
rainstorms and an inadequate outlet, the stream waters flowed 
at a speed heightened by the improvements, burst through the 
banks of the river and damaged the property, and the surface 
waters flooded it. 
[4] Id.-Surface Waters-Protection Against-Obstructing Flow. 
A private landowner may not obstruct the flow of surface 
waters that naturally drain a~rOSSi his property from adjoin-
ing lands. 
[5] Id. - Surface Waters - Protection Against-Public Improve-
ments-Right to Obstruct Flow.---A governmental agency in 
constructing public improvements may. validly exercise its 
police power to obstruct the flow of surface waters not run-
ning in a natural channel without making compensation for 
the resulting damages. 
[3J See 27 R. C. L. 1146. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Eminent Domain, § 43 (1); [2J 
Waters, §396; [3,5J Waters, §400; [4] Waters, §391j' [6] Ap-
peal and Error, § 1431. 
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[6] Appeal - Determination - Reversal ~ Grounds - Failure to 
Amend Complaint After Demurrer Sustained.-When a de-
murrer to a complaint is properly sustained with leave to 
amend, and the plaintiffs decline to do so, the judgment will 
not be reversed on appeal in order to allow an amendment, 
since by declining to amend the plaintiffs take the position 
that whatever facts they might prove in support of their 
action were alleged in the complaint and they voluntarily 
base their case upon the demurrer. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action against flood control district for damages for in-
juries to land as the result of flooding. Judgment for de-
fendant after the sustaining of a demurrer to the complaint, 
and plaintiffs' refusal to amend, affirmed. 
Joseph K. Coady and Henry K. Elder for Appellants, 
J. H. 0 'Connor, County Counsel, S. V. O. Prichard, 
Assistant County Counsel, and Arthur S. Loveland, Deputy 
County Counsel, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs are the owners of certain land 
in Los Angeles County near the Los Angeles River. The 
Los Angeles County Flood Control District replaced the low 
permeable dikes that bordered the river with concrete levees, 
and constructed a concrete embankment running at right 
angles to the levees away from the river. These improve-
ments, constructed for the purpose of flood control, increased 
the velocity of the water flowing in the river by preventing 
it from spreading out over adjoining lands, and obstructed 
the drainage of surface waters into the river. The only 
provision for drainage of the area created by the levee and 
the embankment was a four foot culvert opening into the 
river at a point near the junction of the levee and the em-
bankment. On March 2, 1938, a heavy rainstorm occurred. 
The water flowed in the river at a speed heightened by de-
fendant's improvements, burst through the river banks and 
damaged plaintiffs' property. The surface waters, pre-
vented by defendant's improvements from draining into the 
river, flooded plaintiffs' land. Plaintiffs thereupon brought 
this action against the flood contrQldistrict, claiming the 
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right to recover damages under article I, section 14 of the 
California Constitution. Defendant's demurrer to the com-
plaint was sustained, and plaintiffs have appealed after 
refusing to amend. 
[1] Compensation for private property taken or damaged 
for·· a public use must be made under article I, section 14, 
only when the taking or damaging of property is not so 
essential to the public health, safety, and morals as to be 
justified under the "police power," and the injury is one 
which would give rise to a cause of action on the part of the 
owner if it were inflicted by a private person. (Archer v. 
Oity of Los Angeles, ante, p. 19 [119 Pac. (2d) 1], this day 
decided.) 
[2] A lower riparian owner has no redress for injury to 
his land caused by improvements in the stream when there 
has been no diversion of water out of its natural channel. 
(Archer v. City of Los Angeles, supra.) [3] The present 
complaint, therefore, does not state a good cause of action 
against the defendant for injuries caused by the overflow of 
the water flowing in the stream. 
[4] In California a private land owner may not obstruct 
the flow of surface waters that naturally drain across his 
property from adjoining land. (Los Angeles Oemetery As-
sociation v. City of Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 461 [37 Pac. 375].) 
[5] In the present case the plaintiffs would therefore have 
a cause of action against a private person who obstructed the 
flow of surface waters from their land. A governmental 
agency, however, in constructing public improvements such 
as streets and highways, may validly exercise its "police 
power" to obstruct the flow of surface waters not running in 
a natural channel without making compensation for the re-
sulting damage. (Corcoran v. City of Benicia, 96 Cal. 1 
[30 Pac. 798, 31 Am. St. Rep. 171] ; Oonniff v. San Francisco, 
67 Cal. 45 [7 Pac.· 41] ; Jefferis v. Oity of Monterey Park, 
14 Cal. App. (2d) 113 [57 Pac. (2d) 1374]; Lampe v. San 
Francisco, 124 Cal. 546 [57 Pac. 461, 1001] ; see 7 So. Cal. L. 
Rev. 295 et seq.) The construction of improvements along 
a stream for purposes of flood control is no less essential to 
the public health and safety than the grading of streets 
(see Gray v.Reclamation District, 174 Cal. 622 [T63 Pac. 
1024] ; Lamb v. Reclamation District, 73 Cal. 125 [14 Pac. 
625, 2 Am. St. Rep. 775] ; Jackson v. United Stat(}s, 230 U. S. 
I~ ~ 
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1 [33 Sup. Ct. 1011, 57 L. Ed. 1363]; Hughes v. United 
States, 230 U. S. 24 [33 Sup. Ct. 1019, 57 L. Ed. 1374); 
Franklin v. United States, 101 Fed. (2d) 459), and a gov-
ernmental agency should no more be liable in the one case 
than in the other for obstructing surface waters. Plaintiffs 
do not allege that the obstructed surface waters werc flowing 
in a natural channel. The defendant therefore is under no 
obligation to compensate 'for the damage caused by the 
obstruction. 
[6] Plaintiffs admit that the improvements were con-
structed by the defendant for the purpose of fioodcontrol 
and the facts alleged in plaintiffs' complaint have been ac-
ceptedas true. It therefore appears as a matter of law 
that defendant was properly exercising its police power and 
there is no reason for returning the case to the lower court 
for trial. Likewise there is no basis for giving plaintiffs 
another opportunity to amend their complaint. By declin-
ing to amend after the sustaining of the demurrer by the 
trial court, plaintiffs took the position that whatever facts 
they might prove in support of their actioD were alleged in 
the complaint and they voluntarily based their case upon the 
demurrer. (Goldtree v. Spreckels, 135 Cal. 666, 672 [67 
Pac. 1091] ; Sutter v. San Francisco, 36 OaL 112, 116, 117.) 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I dissent. 
The majority decision is predicated on the police power 
doctrine and the main authority cited therefor in Archer 
v. City of Los Angeles, L. A. Nos. 17,612 and 17,613 (ante, 
p. 19 [119 Pac. (2d) 1]), this day decided. I pointed 
out in my dissent in those cases that although the ma-
jority opinion discussed the police power, it came to no 
conclusion in regard to its application to those cases; that 
discussion was dictum. In the instant case that dictum is 
the only authority relied upon for the majority decision. 
This is a practical illustration from a theoretical standpoint 
of "lifting one's self by his own bootstraps." That is. a 
dictum is set forth in one case to be used as authority for 
the decision in another case decided at the same time. This 
process is rendered even more obnoxious when the dictum is 
unsound, as is the case here. 
Nov. 1941.] DUTTON V. INTERSTATE INVESTMENT CORP. 65 
In my dissenting. opinion in the A.llison and Archer cases, 
I have endeavored to point out the inapplicability of the 
police power doctrine to a factual situation where property 
has been taken or damaged for a public improvement such 
as in the ease at bar. What I said thereis applicable to the 
case at. bar, and for the reasons there given and under the 
authorities there cited, the judgment in the case at bar should 
be reversed. 
Curtis, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied December 
12, 1941. Curtis,J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
Houser, J., did not participate therein. Spence, J., acting 
pro tem. 
[L. A. Nos. 17067, 17481. In Bank. Nov. 24, 1941.] 
M. C. DUTTON, Respondent, v. INTERSTATE INVEST-
MENT CORPORATION (a Oorporation), Appellant. 
(Two Cases.) 
[1] OiI~Contracts, etc.-Leases-Assignment-As Transfer of 
Realty: Frauds,Statute of-Agreements Relating to Real 
Property-Assignment of Interest iri . Oil.-An· agreement as-
signing a fractional interest in the oil and hydrocarbons pro-
duced under an oil and gas lease operates to transfer an 
interest in realproperty,and is required by the statutes to 
be in writing .. (Civ. Code, § 1624 (4) ;CodeCiv. Proc., 
§ 1973 (4).) 
[2] Frauds, Statute of-Agreements Relating to Real Property--
SharingProfits.-A contract whereby a party is to have a 
fractional interest in the net profits from a transaction in-
volving the procurement of an oil ·lease is not required to be 
in writing. 
[3] Id.-Operation-Estoppel to Assert Statute-Agreement to 
Reduce to Writing: Trusts-Resulting Trusts-Effect of Stat-
[3J See 12 Cal. Jur. 934. 
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Oil, § 34; Frauds, Statute of, § 36; 
[2] Frauds, Statute of, § 36; E3J Frauds, Statute of, § '59(1) ; 
Trusts, §95; [4] Contracts, § 210; [5] Contracts, § 274., 
19 C. (2d)-3 
